Forensic Computing

Final Project (Case Study) Tyler Abbott (300137187)

Case Description:

Our suspect in this case is an employee at a fortune 500 company that has been reported by an anonymous entity, reporting that they have "illegal" files installed on their machine. Our suspect works within the I.T. Department, and is a component of the "Help Desk" team. An OSINT report has been run on this individual to find that he/she goes by several aliases online, and owns several domain names. Many of these domains seem strange in nature, where experts are led to believe this person is possibly selling or distributing illegal photographs.

In the case, the suspect has had 1 business day to cover their tracks, as it took 24 hours to get a warrant from the local police department to obtain & secure the employee's workstation.

Before obtaining the device, we take notes and pictures of each action we take, and take careful notes of any notable markings, serial numbers, or irregularity. While the device is still running, we use our mobile equipment and make an image of the machine and determine the SHA-256 or MD5SUM of the image file. After successfully securing the device, we placed it in a signed & sealed bag so it can be brought into our laboratory for safekeeping or further investigation.

The rest of the investigation will be analyzing a bit-by-bit accurate copy of the employee's machine, and finding concrete evidence that coincides with the anonymous report.

Case Files:

https://phoenixnap.dl.sourceforge.net/project/dftt/Test%20Images/9_%20FAT%20Volume%20Label%20%231/9-fat-label.zip

Results & Findings:

Expected findings:

Our team expects to find incriminating evidence, or illegal activity from the materials retrieved from the employee's workstation.

Steps taken:

- 1. We will first need a workstation to work from, to analyse the image contents and perform operations on.
 - a. Our first instincts were to use the provided UNIX server: learn.taliaq.com, however, this did not seem sustainable as we did not have "sudo" access to perform necessary actions. (sudo is required to mount drives, and required for installing The Sleuth KIt)
 - b. Our second attempt was to spin-up a local server rack running ESXi 6.7, where multiple VMs can be run simultaneously. This proved to be difficult, as our experts forgot the 'root' password.
 - c. Our last two resorts were to spin-up a local Raspberry Pi running Debian Ubuntu, or spin-up an AWS EC2 instance. The latter method was taken, as our team was concerned about the networking and computational ability of a Raspberry Pi device.
- 2. Once a workstation has been created, we need to install the necessary materials.
 - a. curl
 https://phoenixnap.dl.sourceforge.net/project/dftt/Test%20Images/9_%20FAT%20Volum
 e%20Label%20%231/9-fat-label.zip --output 9-fat-label.zip
- 3. Once installed, we are required to unzip the materials, and save the files with appropriate naming conventions. We will need to run an 'MD5SUM' on the materials as proof the image has not been tampered with in transmission or during operation.

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$ admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$ md5sum 9 -fat-label.dd aa834dca822918de45792f4e115516b9 9-fat-label.dd admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$
```

This MD5 hash is equivalent to our original copy, so we can ensure that no data was tampered during transmission: <u>FAT Volume Label Test #1 (sourceforge.net)</u>

4. Since this image is more-or-less a black box to us, we will need to do some reconnaissance on it.

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$ img_stat 9-fat-label.dd

IMAGE FILE INFORMATION

Image Type: raw

Size in bytes: 10321920

Sector size: 512
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$
```

This image proves that this is a RAW image, and we can see the sector size and total size is around 1.29 MB.

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$ fsstat 9-fat-label.dd
FILE SYSTEM INFORMATION
File System Type: FAT16
OEM Name: MSDOS5.0
Volume ID: 0x58eee665
Volume Label (Boot Sector): LABEL1
Volume Label (Root Directory): LABEL2
File System Type Label: FAT16
Sectors before file system: 8064
File System Layout (in sectors)
Total Range: 0 - 20159
* Reserved: 0 - 1
** Boot Sector: 0
* FAT 0: 2 - 80
* FAT 1: 81 - 159
* Data Area: 160 - 20159
** Root Directory: 160 - 191
** Cluster Area: 192 - 20159
METADATA INFORMATION
Range: 2 - 320006
Root Directory: 2
CONTENT INFORMATION
Sector Size: 512
Cluster Size: 512
Total Cluster Range: 2 - 19969
FAT CONTENTS (in sectors)
192-192 (1) -> EOF
193-202 (10) -> 232
203-231 (29) -> EOF
232-410 (179) -> EOF
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$ _
```

This command further expands on our reconnaissance, and we can see the File System type is FAT16, and there are 8064 sectors before the file system. This information may prove to be useful later.

5. Once reconnaissance is complete, we may start investigating the contents of the image.

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$ fls -r 9-fat-label.dd
                     (Volume Label Entry)
r/r 3:
        LABEL2
                New Folder
d/d * 5:
d/d 6: dir1
                        DLL (Volume Label Entry)
+ r/r 517:
                FILE2
//v 320003:
                $MBR
v/v 320004:
                $FAT1
                $FAT2
v/v 320005:
                $OrphanFiles
V/V 320006:
```

Running the 'fls' command, we can see all files and directories on an image. We can manipulate the results by adding different options, such as '-r' for recursive. Option '-d' can be used for deleted entries only.

Once we have identified there are some deleted items, it is good to recover these early on, as the suspect is likely to try and cover their tracks by 'deleting' the evidence.

We can use command 'tsk_recover':

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$ tsk_recover -i raw -e 9-fat-label.dd ./recovered
Files Recovered: 2
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label$
```

This is where I discovered a deleted directory and deleted file.

Investigating the file further:

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label/recovered/dir1$ file FILE2\ \ DLL\ \(Volume\ Label\ Entry\)

FILE2 DLL (Volume Label Entry): JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01, aspect ratio, density 1x1, segment length 16, baseline, precision 8, 554x365, components 3


admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label/recovered/dir1$
```

This is where we can see the this deleted file is a JPEG image.

Quickly analyzing the hexdump we can confirm this to be legitimate:

```
00 10 4A 46
9999999
          FF D8 FF F0
                                   49 46 00 01
                                                01 00 00 01
                                                             00 01 00 00
                                                                         FF DB 00 43
                                                                                       .....JFIF.......
9000018
          00 08 06 06
                       07 06 05 08
                                   07
                                      07 07 09
                                                09 08 0A 0C
                                                             14 0D 0C 0B
                                                                         ØB
                                                                            0C 19 12
                                                                                      .....$.' ",#..(7)
                               1D
                                                24 2E 27 20
00000030
          13 0F
               14 1D
                       1A 1F
                            1E
                                   1A 1C 1C 20
                                                             22 2C
                                                                  23
                                                                     1C
                                                                         1C
                                                                            28
                                                                               37 29
                                                                                      ,01444.'9=82<.342...C...
                                   39 3D 38 32
00000048
          2C 30 31 34
                       34 34 1F 27
                                                3C 2E 33 34
                                                             32 FF DB 00
                                                                         43 01 09 09
00000060
          09 0C 0B 0C
                       18 0D 0D 18
                                   32 21 1C 21
                                                32 32 32 32
                                                             32 32 32 32
                                                                         32 32 32 32
                                                                                      .....2!.!22222222222
00000078
          32 32 32 32
                       32 32 32 32
                                   32 32 32 32
                                                32 32 32 32
                                                             32 32 32 32
                                                                         32 32 32 32
                                                                                      222222222222222222222
9999999
                       32 32 32 32
                                   32 32 32 32
                                                32 32 FF C0
                                                             00 11 08 01
                                                                         6D 02 2A 03
          32 32 32 32
                                                                                      222222222222222....m.
8A0000A8
          01 22 00 02
                       11 01 03 11
                                   01
                                      FF C4 00
                                                1F 00 00 01
                                                             05 01 01 01
                                                                         01 01 01 00
                                                06 07 08 09
999999C9
          00 00 00 00
                      00 00 00 01
                                   02 03 04 05
                                                             0A 0B FF C4
                                                                         00 B5 10 00
          02 01 03 03
                                   05 04 04 00
999999
                      92 94 93 95
                                                00 01 7D 01
                                                             92 93 99 94
                                                                         11 05 12 21
                                                                                      71 14 32 81
                                                                                      1A..Qa."q.2....#B...R..$
99999F9
          31 41 06 13
                      51 61 07 22
                                                91 A1 08 23
                                                             42 B1 C1 15
                                                                         52 D1 F0 24
                      09 0A 16 17
                                   18 19 1A 25
                                                            2A 34 35 36
                                                                                      3br......%'()*456789:
90000108
          33 62 72 82
                                                26 27 28 29
                                                                         37 38 39 3A
0000120
          43 44 45 46
                      47 48 49 4A
                                   53 54 55 56 57 58 59 5A
                                                            63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6A
                                                                                      CDEFGHIJSTUVWXYZcdefghij
```

Since this AWS machine has no GUI, I will have to copy this to my own personal device to investigate the JPEG, and visually confirm what it is:



The found file is incriminating evidence, and we now need to prove that this file exists on the employee's machine.

We can take an MD5SUM of the target file:

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label/recovered/dir1$ admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label/recovered/dir1$ md5sum file 8aeca328aa6fbb7d2ec01f8c2f3e4bbd file admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label/recovered/dir1$ admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label/recovered/dir1$
```

Lastly, before completing the formal report to be presented to the courts, we have gotten a "head's up" from the anonymous contact, that the phrase "over here!" may be useful for our investigation.

We can run this string against the image contents:

```
admin@ip-172-31-67-1:~/9-fat-label/recovered$ strings -t d LABEL2\ \ \ \ \ \ \(Volume\ Label\ Entry\) | grep -iE "o ver here"

8915 over here
```

6. Our team has found incriminating evidence and activity. Our last step is to finalize our formal report with irrefutable proof that the target suspect has illegal media on their device. We will bring this evidence to the local police department and court system, where we will present the results in a professional manner.

Sources:

FAT Volume Label Test #1 (sourceforge.net)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-IE2j04Chc

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ld9RW3pxAKg

https://www.howtoinstall.me/ubuntu/18-04/sleuthkit/

http://blog.hakzone.info/posts-and-articles/linux/disk-analysis-with-fdisk-mmls-fsstat-and-fls/

https://unix.stackexchange.com/questions/577050/bash-fdisk-command-not-found

https://www.forensicfocus.com/forums/general/mmls-fsstat-fls-cannot-determine-partition-type-of-dd/